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THE IMPOTENT STYLE OF RONALD REAGAN:
A - E = <GC REDfVIVA
Ronald H. Carpenter
Let A equal acf/o—the rhetorical canon of delivery, the effective mar>-
agement of voice and body in oral discourse. Let E equal e/ocuf/o—the canon
of style, the mastery of word choice and word arrangement for functional
eloquence. For President Reagan, A minus E equals a less-than-great com
municator after all. That was my thesis for an earlier essay in this journal.^
For presidential discourse on television, Mr. Reagan's prowess with deliv
ery is perhaps unsurpassed. Only occasional lapses mar his performance,
such as disfiuencies in some answers and stumbling through the concluding
illustration during the first televised debate with Walter Mondale in 1904.
For the second debate, though, Ronald Reagan returned to his customary
performance levels. Conducing to his admirable acf/o are a well-modulated
baritone voice capable of controlled variation between restrained forceful-
ness and almost hushed whispers, eye contact, meaningful gestures, physical
poise, and a superb sense of when to pause for clarity, emphasis, and emo
tional effect. Yes, some critics might carp about the overuse of that studied
nod of the head, with pursed lips, typically to stage right, but Ronald Reagan's
acting background and training did not include Stanislavski's "method." For
most Americans, as the audience in the theatre of the presidency, that facial
gesture constitutes but additional evidence, albeit as paramessage, of osten
sible determination. In sum, this president's rhetorical management of act/o
warrants acclaim.
Acclaim is not warranted, however, for elocutio and style in discourse. Mr.
Reagan—along with his writers—avoids those nuances of syntax and lexicon
that transform mundane sentences into memorable eloquence. We may
recall President Reagan's quip about sending Rambo to solve a problem or
his "on-mike" slip about when World War 111 will start. No lines, though,
rank with Abraham Lincoln's schemes of sntistrophe and asyndeton in "gov
ernment of the people, by the people, for the people;" Franklin Roosevelt's
traductio in "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself;" or John Kennedy's
ubiquitous antithesis, "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what
you can do for your country." Nor has Mr. Reagan found an apt trope as
catchphrase to approach the rhetorical success of Roosevelt's "New Deal,"
Kennedy's "New Frontier," or even Richard Nixon's "Great Silent Majority"
(our current president's oft-repeated but tautological "New Beginning" did
not catch on, but we were fascinated briefly by his "evil empire" charac
terization of the Soviets).
Ronald H. Carpenter is Professor of English at the University of Florida.
Portions of this update of his earlier essay were read at the 1985 Speech
Communication Association Convention in Denver.
' See Ronald H. Carpenter, "Ronald Reagan and the Presidental Imperative to Stylize:
A - E = <GC," Speaker and Cave/ 20 (1982-83); 1-6.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 24, Nos. 2-4 (1987), 53-59.
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54 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
In Roderick Hart's estimate, "Reagan's language virtually never calls at
tention to itself," the president's "body, voice, and smile do the necessary
emotional embellishing," and "his language is drawn from life as it is lived
most simply Ronald Reagan is no Bryan or Lincoln or Stevenson. He
impresses by means of dramatic action, not by means of deftly chosen words.
His pleadings find favor because Ronald Reagan himself is attractive." And
thus, to Hart, this president is "not the Nation's orator, or a master stylist."^
Clearly, President Reagan—sans eloquent style—has demonstrated com
munication effectiveness for the nonce. Equally clear is the fact that stylistic
prowess does not itself assure greatness as a communicator (too many voters
perceived Adiai Stevenson's prowess with words as a paramessage saying
"egghead" when a pragmatic "General" Elsenhower promised simply, "I
shall go to Korea"). Nevertheless, presidential words can and do endure
rhetorically to epitomize exceptionally well what Americans want said well-
but they are unable to articulate effectively themselves. Widely published
portraits of Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy often quote sentences
easy enough to select and print as reminders of an essential optimism that
should guide our future endeavors; but while Ronald Reagan's nostalgic
appeals about our mythic past may be equally appropriate as responses to
his rhetorical situation, this president's portrait in years to come could be
published with a snip of videotape affixed. His words, for lack of eloquent
style, will not endure as morals and maxims for long-term influence upon
our attitudes and actions.^ Thus, because the fleeting visual and auditory
stimuli of Mr. Reagan's poise and polish with delivery cannot last in our
collective consciousness to guide us, he will be our less-than-great com
municator after all.
During his first term, Reagan's style in discourse displayed several ten
dencies that undermined eloquence. Recall these examples from his First
Inaugural as well as his State of the Union addresses in 1982 and 1984: a
conversational and stylistically inept well or now to introduce sentences, as
in "Well, I believe we the Americans of today are ready to act" or "Now, I
believe there is.. a propensity for idiomatic contractions, such as we're,
it's, and we'll; clusters of words without predicates, passing off as sentences,
such as "A man of humility who came to greatness reluctantly" or "And
then beyond the Reflecting Pool, the dignified columns of the Lincoln Me
morial"; and antitheses that do not capitalize on the advantage of recency
over primacy to end on the upbeat and emphasize the positive (he prefers
"The future is best decided by ballots, not bullets" or "government" that
would "work with us not over us; to stand by our side, not ride our back").
Moreover, in stylized parallelisms, Ronald Reagan squanders repetitions upon
impotent words, such as contractions, impersonal pronouns, and other lan
guage choices devoid of semantic punch (unlike the potent parallelism of
' Roderick Hart, Verbal Style and the Presidency: A Computer-based Analysis (Orlando:
Academic, 1984) 212-37 ("The Great Communicator and Beyond").
' See Carpenter, "Presidential Imperative" and Ronald H. Carpenter, "The Symbolic
Substance of Style in Presidential Discourse," Sty/e 16 (Winter 1982): 38-49.
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Winston Churchill's "We shall fight" or Martin Luther King's "I have a dream")/
And that stylistic impotence characterized his Second Inaugural—wherein
presidents no longer seek success at the polls but prominence in posterity.
Amplifying upon his proposed "security shield" in space, Mr. Reagan ignores
positive if not archetypal connotations of either word: "It wouldn't kill peo
ple, it would destroy weapons. /( wouldn't militarize space, it would help
demilitarize the arsenals of earth. It would render nuclear weapons obso
lete." We can learn what is repeated so why teach /(to us? And colloquial
contractions still abound, as in "we've lighted the world," "there's no story
more heartening," and "we've come to a turning point"; and the deletion
of that's would enhance "we live in a world that's lit by lightning." The
president also persists with idiomatic fillers, as in "Now, here is a place for
the Federal Government" or "Now, there is another area " But are
sounds to accompany nods of the head with pursued lips so important?
Consider what is /ost by saying "Well, with heart and hand, let us stand as
one today."
Mr. Reagan's Second Inaugural Address also ignored possibilities for bal
anced antitheses. Although "past greatness" and "better tomorrow" offer
opportunity for sharp apposition, he prefers a diffuse "Voices were raised
saying that we had to look to our past greatness and glory. But we, the
present-day Americans, are not given to looking backward. In this blessed
land, there is always a better tomorrow." Similarly, government as our "ser
vant" rather than our "master" lends itself to an incisive epigram, yet the
moral is buried: "But in another sense, our new beginning is a continuation
of that beginning created two centuries ago when, for the first time in history,
government, the people said, was not our master. It is our servant; its only
power that which we, the people, allow it to have." And antitheses still tend
to deemphasize by position positive values that more likely should be reaf
firmed, as in "We have begun to increase the rewards for work, savings and
investment; reduce the increase in the cost and size of government and its
interference in people's lives." By reversing the two halves, the line em
phasizes the positive; by eliminating "the increase in" from "reduce the
increase in the cost," the antithesis is sharper; and for still greater balance
and incisiveness, a script doctor might recommend "We have reduced the
cost and size of government—and increased the rewards for work, savings,
and investment."^
An eye or ear for antithesis was also needed for Mr. Reagan's address in
May 1985 at Bitburg, Germany, after visiting a military cemetary where forty-
* For other examples of that early stylistic ineptness, see "Presidential Imperative."
For this present essay, I quote Mr. Reagan from the following texts: First Inaugural
Address, Vital Speeches (15 February 1981); 258-60; 1982 State of the Union Address,
Vital Speeches (15 February 1982); 258-62; 1894 State of the Union Address, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents 20 (30 January 1984): 87-94; Second Inaugural
Address, Vital Speeches (1 February 1985): 226-28; and the Bitburg address, New York
Times 6 May 1985: A8. In ail quotations used in this essay, the italics are mine and are
used to emphasize the stylistic factor being considered.
^ See a more complete discussion of this aspect of stylistic effectiveness in Ronald
H. Carpenter, "The Ubiquitous Antithesis; A Functional Source of Style in Presidential
Discourse," Sty/e 10 (Fall 1976): 426-41.
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eight SS troops were buried with two thousand other World War II German
troops. Epideictic or occasional addresses are also known as demonstrative
oratory, as speakers demonstrate ability to say well what audiences already
accept as true. Admittedly, the president had some balanced antitheses in
sequence: "We who were bitter adversaries are now the strongest of allies.
In the place of fear we have sown trust, and out of the ruins of war has
blossomed an enduring peace." Nevertheless, he also opts for imbalance, as
in "But we can give meaning to the past by learning its lessons and making
a better future" (one verb in the first half is overbalanced by two in the
obverse half). And opportunities are simply missed: "crimes and wars of
yesterday" calls for apposition with praiseworthy conditions of "today";
"terrors of the past" could be juxtaposed with what is admirable in the
"present" or "future;" and three positive values which "began" might follow
"on this 40th anniversay of World War II, we mark the day when the hate,
the evil, and the obscenities ended." One line in particular calls for epi
grammatic quality, after referring to "the veterans and families of American
servicemen who still carry the scars and feel the painful losses of that war."
What could have been the incisive moral—drawn so well In form to be
irrefutable in ideational content—was undermined by an idiomatic Inter
jection: "Some old wounds have been reopened, and this 1 regret very much,
because this should be a time of healing." As the Rhetorica Ad Herennium
observed about stylistic "reasoning by countraries," a speaker can attain an
eloquent line "which, of two opposite statements, uses one so as neatly and
directly to prove the other." That antithesis "is not only agreeable to the
ear on account of its brief and complete rounding off, but also by means of
the contrary statement It also forcibly proves what the speaker needs to
prove; and from a statement which is not open to question it draws a thought
which is in question, in such a way that the inference cannot be refuted, or
can be refuted only with much the greatest difficulty."' This is the effect of
John Kennedy's "let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to
negotiate." Perhaps Ronald Reagan cannot attain the symmetry and urbanitas
of Kennedy nee Sorenson, but his syntax and lexicon could conform better
to desiderata advocated in classical rhetorical theory.
My deference to rhetorical theorists of antiquity is not one of unques
tioning acceptance of traditional lore. Rather, classical treatises on style
evolved in an oral-aural society wherein rhetoricians attuned their ears to
those qualities by which spoken lines attained eloquence to be preserved
as written words associated for posterity with individual orators. Morever,
those theorists were pragmatic. Consider Aristotle's observation about an
aphora or epanaphora in these lines from Homer: "Nireus from Syme brought
three curved ships; Nireus, son of Aglaia and of Charopus; Nireus, most
beautiful of all the Greeks who came to Troy, saving Achilles only." As the
Rhetoric advises, "if a good many things are said about a person, his name
' IV. 18. 25-26. Taking a cue from Kenneth Burke, as well as from commentary on
both rhetorical theory and information theory, I have discussed this notion in greater
detail in two other articles. See Carpenter, "Symbolic Substance of Style" and Ronald
H. Carpenter, "The Stylistic Basis of Burkeian Identification," Today's Speech 20 (Winter
1972): 19-23.
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will have to be mentioned pretty often; accordingly, if his name is often
mentioned, one has the impression that a good deal has been said about
him. By the use of this fallacy, Homer, who mentions Nireus only in this
single passage, makes him important, and has preserved his memory, though
in the rest of the poem he says never a word more about him."' Mr. Reagan
would preserve for us, through style, an impotent "it is" or worse, "well."
When classical treatises identified sources of eloquence, they also de
scribed corresponding deficiencies or faults of style. As the undesirable
counterpart of a "grand style," the Rhetorka Ad Herennium eschewed "swol
len style" wherein "turgid and inflated language" is "more impressive than
the theme demands."® To Demetrius, impressive or grand style has Its cor
responding fault in "frigidity" or "that which overshoots its appropriate
expression," for "the writer who deals with a trivial subject in weighty lan
guage is like a man who pretends to have qualities he does not possess,
undeterred by his lack of them, or like a man who boasts about trifles."'
"Now," "well," and "it" are trifles, but the classical metaphors of "frigid"
and "swollen" also apply to this passage from Mr. Reagan's Bitburg address:
Twenty-two years ago. President John F. Kennedy went to the Berlin Wail
and proclaimed that he, too, was a Berliner. Today, freedom-loving people
around the world must say; I am a Berliner, I am a jew in a world still threatened
by anti-semitism, I am an Afghan, and I am a prisoner of the Gulag, I am a
refugee in a crowded boat foundering off the coast of Vietnam, I am Laotian,
a Cambodian,aCuban,anda Miskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potential
victim of totalitarianism.
John Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" was "forceful or intense style," for the
Greeks believed that "length dissolves vehemence, and a more forceful
effect is attained where much is said in a few words."" Ronald Reagan's
counterpart has loo many hypothetical referents for "I" (which some people
might hear, literally, as "I, Ronald Reagan ... I, Ronald Reagan ... .). Instead
of "grandeur," the effect is more a boast "about triffles." Perhaps Mr. Reagan
prefers "language drawn from life as it is lived most simply," as Roderick
Hart suggests, but his eye might wander once in a while to a favorable niche
in posterity among eloquent predecessors. With the proven box-office ap
peal of its star, "Presidential Productions" can hire the best script doctors.
Their absence may be due as much to technology as to Mr. Reagan's sense
of style (or lack thereof).
As a comunicator, Ronald Reagan is the product of Hollywood sound
stages and television studios. Both environments are intimate spatially. On
film sets, addressees of actors' lines are typically in close physical proximity;
for television the impersonal addressee of the camera lens is comfortably
close. In both physical contexts, voices need never be raised above con-
' Aristotle, Rhetoric 1414a. See also Demetrius, On Style 61. From Homer's Iliad 2.
671-74, the passage was a favorite of critics and rhetoricians who sought to explicate
stylistic effectiveness.
MV. 10, 15.
' Demetrius 119 and 165. For the Greeks, "to discuss trivialities in an exalted style"
Is, in their proverb about rhetorical style in discourse, "beautifying a monkey."
Demetrius 240-42. For additional discussion of how Mr. Reagan forgoes eloquent
brevitas in favor of wordiness, see Carpenter, "Presidential Imperative."
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trolled, well-modulated decibel levels. On Hollywood sets, boom mikes
follow actors everywhere; in television studios or at podlums for televised
speeches, directional microphones capture faithfully every nuance of voice.
Indeed, sharp increases in vocal volume cause consternation among audio
engineers as needles on their dials peak into the red. Thus, technology of
the microphone could have constrained and conditioned Mr. Reagan's vocal
behavior—with a corresponding undesirable influence upon his style in
discourse. Compare Mr. Reagan with that American president he often
mentions favorably. Recall Franklin Roosevelt's auxesis "To some generations
much is given; of other generations much is expected; this generation of
Americans has a rendezvous with destiny." As read aloud conversationally
with a Reaganesque, moderate volume, the line does not "make it." At
Franklin Field in Philadelphia on 27 June 1936, Roosevelt's expression was
characterized by a staccato, forceful "to some generations," followed by a
still louder, percussive "of other generations," and "this generation of Amer
icans has a rendezvous with destiny" was almost strident in sound. Outdoors,
to a large audience, the microphone overheard the stylistic climax comple
menting Roosevelt's dramatic delivery (of course, FDR could also be superbly
conversational for radio, and his "Fireside Chats" characteristically used syn
tax and lexicon "from life as it is lived most simply," delivered nevertheless
with a voice capable of "necessary emotional embellishing"). Our current
president, though, does not use lines whose style demands vocal intensity
other than that which is moderate at most. Whereas Franklin Roosevelt was
a master of the microphone, Ronald Reagan is its slave.
The television camera itself contributes similarly to Mr. Reagan's incapa
bility for eloquent style. As a "cool" medium, in Marshall McCluhan's notion,
television has spawned a host of suitably subdued, "cool" communicators,
and that restraint has been the norm for televised presidential communi
cation for two decades. To complement his control over voice for micro
phones, Mr. Reagan makes sure that television cameras typically "see" and
transmit a superbly poised communicator. For John Kennedy, though, tele
vision cameras often would "oversee" oratory played with passion to listeners
face-to-face before him. The difference is subtle but salient. Technological
paraphernalia of electronic communication—themselves as audience—are
impersonal and thereby unworthy of impassioned statements befitting peo
ple gathered in expansive settings. And although Mr. Reagan's performance
is seen and heard ultimately by a mass public, he plays to and for the lens
and microphone, which are unmoved by the eloquent lines that audiences
accept as their persuasive arguments and slogans, morals and maxims. For
an actor-communicator conditioned to the spatial confines of Hollywood
sets and intimate television studios, grandeur does not play well.
So in his starring role as our national spokesperson, Mr. Reagan is adept,
indeed, maybe more than just adept. And he was elected in 1980 in part
because his communication prowess was salient when contrasted with Jimmy
Carter's communication ineptness." The causal factor, however, is delivery
and how he says things with voice and body, an outward display of poise
Carpenter, "Presidential Imperative.'
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and prowess in ac(/o to rekindle our elders' fondest memories of a Franklin
Roosevelt—and the communication cWc to warm the heart of younger Yup
pies and Yumpies. But without e/ocuf/o this president can be only our less-
than-great communicator after all. For Ronald Reagan, this is the legacy of
impotent style.
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JESSE ALEXANDER HELMS: SECULAR
PREACHER OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT
Robert V. Friedenberg
In the Fall 1985 edition of this journal, C. Scott Baker and Dean Fadely
suggest that much of Senator Jesse Alexander Helms's success results from
the ways in which he employs the principles of identification. They find that
"like most political figures, Helms utilizes the techniques of associative Iden
tification. However, he also uses an opposite principle—a rhetoric of iden
tification through dissociation."^ Moreover, Baker and Fadely suggest that
these rhetorical tactics seem to work for Helms, and they attribute much of
the success of his last three election campaigns to them. Baker and Fadely
are accurate in recognizing the importance of Helms's use of the principles
of identification. Further, they are accurate in suggesting that he utilizes
dissociation or, as they term it, "a negative form of identification," to a greater
degree than do most contemporary political figures.^ Indeed, their study is
a valuable addition to the study of political campaign communication, for it
well illustrates a candidate who flies in the face of traditional advice to identify
and to succeed through dissociation.
By focusing on a rhetorical tactic or strategy, however. Baker and Fadely
limit their examination of Helms's rhetoric and, therefore, do not fully treat
the underlying source of Helms's success. Helms's uses of the principles of
identification, particularly his willingness to utilize dissociation rhetoric, are
manifestations of the underlying sources of his success. The sources of Jesse
Helms's success are the senator's unwavering confidence in what he fre
quently calls the virtue of "America's Judaeo-Christian heritage" and his
constant efforts to apply the principles of that heritage to contemporary
problems. Helms's willingness to attempt to utilize religious principles to
justify public policy provides him the rationale for the exceptionally strong
anticommunist stand, the harsh condemnation of liberal philosophy, and the
vigorous pro-family positions that Baker and Fadely find in his rhetoric.
Importantly, because one does not compromise on fundamental questions
of morality, Helms's willingness to attempt to utilize religious principles to
justify public policy makes it impossible for him to compromise and hence
causes him to make extensive use of disassociative rhetoric.
This study illustrates the centrality of Helms's religious perspective to his
speaking by examining his use of religious justifications for public policy
positions. The study also examines the Senate speaking of Helms, illustrating
how his religious perspective has caused him to use both disassociative
Robert V. Friedenberg is Professor of Communication at Miami University,
Hamilton, Ohio 45011. He wishes to thank the Miami University Faculty
Research Fund for a grant that facilitated this study.
^ C. Scott Baker and Dean Fadely, "The 1984 Political Campaign: The Rhetoric of
Jesse Helms," Speaker and Cave! 23 (Fail 1985): 1.
' Baker and Fadely 1.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 24, Nos. 2-4 (1987), 60-68.
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rhetoric and dlsassociative political tactics to a greater degree than virtually
any other member of that body. Finally, the study examines Helms's non-
Senate speeches, illustrating that Helms's religious perspective manifests
Itself in political jeremiads that rely heavily on dlsassociative rhetoric.
Religious Justifications and Public Policy Positions
Since his first election to the United States Senate in 1972, Jesse Helms
has become the principle secular preacher of the religious right. It is not
necessarily a coincidence that this period has witnessed the dramatic growth
of political activity on the part of Fundamentalist churches. Heirs to the
Goldwater conservatism of the 1960s, the more militant conservatives of the
1970s and 1980s, like the Goldwater conservatives who preceded them, are
strong supporters of the free enterprise system, strident critics of big gov
ernment, and ardent anticommunists. Unlike the Goldwater conservatives,
the new right of recent years has added a religious and moralistic fervor to
political dialogue. In identifying the principle tenets of conservative phi
losophy, Martin Medhurst has recently pointed to the strong religious strains
that have traditionally permeated it.' While Medhurst is correct to suggest
that those strains have long existed, it has remained for the religious right
of recent years to explicitly and repeatedly argue from religious rationales
when addressing issue after issue of public concern. The overt Introduction
of Judaeo-Christian moral values into the public arena has distinguished the
religious right of the last decade from its predecessors.
Jesse Helms exemplifies this approach that has contributed appreciably to
the shifting of the national agenda to the right. When he entered the Senate,
Helms made this claim: "I made a commitment never to make a speech
without addressing moral issues. Morality is the glue that holds this country
together. You can't get above that."' Helms has largely lived up to his com
mitment by arguing that public policy should consistently be governed by
standards of Judaeo-Christian ethics and morality.
For example, in his 1973 address "Survival of Freedom in an Era of Ne
gotiation" Helms argued that rather than negotiating with the immoral,
atheistic Soviet Union on arms control, we should join the issues of arms
negotiation and negotiation over the basic freedoms denied Soviet citizens.®
Rather than negotiating over the price and quantity of grain that we might
sell to the Soviet Union, we should link our grain concessions to Soviet
concessions to introduce free enterprise capitalism into the agricultural sec
tor of their economy. To Helms, negotiations over arms control or grain
sales do nothing to alter the immoral nature of the Soviet Union. To Helms,
it makes little sense to tacitly lend support to a fundamentally evil society
by allowing it to negotiate arms and food agreements with us, unless we are
able to negotiate changes in the basic evils of that society.®
' Martin Medhurst, "Resistance, Conservatism, and Theory Building: A Cautionary
Note," Western Journal of Speech Communication 49 (1985): 105-06.
' Jesse Helms, personal interview, 8 July 1985.
' Jesse Helms, "Survival of Freedom in an Era of Negotiation," Vital Speeches of the
Day 39 (1973): 764-67.
® Helms, "Survival" 766-67.
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The centrality of Judaeo-Christian morality to Heims's political rhetoric is
even more strikingly evident when he speaks about the wide range of pro-
family issues. Heims's positions on such issues as the Equal Rights Amend
ment, abortion, and prayer in the public schools consistently reflect what
he believes to be the application of Judaeo-Christian principles to contem
porary public issues. No doubt because he feels that Judaeo-Christian mo
rality should animate public policy, Helms feels equally comfortable speaking
to church groups or secular groups about the relationship between religion
and public policies.'
Helms entered the Senate in January of 1973, committed "never to make
a speech without addressing moral issues." Fortuitously for him, this was
virtually the same period of time when many Fundamentalist church leaders
were also discovering politics. The Supreme Court's 1973 pro-abortion de
cision, the Equal Rights Amendment, plans calling for the drafting of women,
and various homosexual rights ordinances, as well as lesser issues, caused
many conservative religious leaders to discover politics.® When Jerry Falwell
and other Fundamentalist leaders began to push politics from the pulpit,
they wedged an opening for Helms to a large body of Americans who were
naturally sympathetic to his views and theretofore politically inactive. Heims's
early willingness to speak out vigorously and uncompromisingly against the
Supreme Court's decisions on abortion and prayer in public schools, along
with his willingness to back his words with amendments and other efforts
to overturn those decisions, quickly made him a political champion of the
Religious Right.'
Heims's Judaeo-Christian justification of many of his specific positions
extends even to his indictment of the entire liberal philosophy. That In
dictment hinges on his belief that
when you have men [liberals) who no longer believe that God is in charge
of human affairs, you have men attempting to take the place of Cod by means
of the Superstate. The all-provident government, which these liberals con
stantly invoke, is the modern-day version of Baal."
In sum, Jesse Heims's religious belief in the virtue of America's Judaeo-
Christian heritage is the underlying causal agent behind virtually all of his
political rhetoric. It provides him with the rationale for the public policy
positions he advocates. Moreover, Heims's perception that he speaks for
fundamental religious truths makes it impossible for him to even consider
compromise with his foes and hence naturally gives rise to the disassociative
rhetoric that Baker and Fadely find to be so prevalent in his rhetoric.
' Sam Hamrick (special assistant for scheduling to Senator Jesse Helms), personal
interview, 8 July 1985.
' For a brief historical account of the political activity of contemporary Fundamen
talist churches, see Richard Viguerie, The New Right: We're Ready to Lead (Falls Church:
Viguerie, 1980) 155-74.
' For an account of the development of Heims's relationship with Fundamentalist
church groups, see William D. Snider, Helms and Hunt: the North Carolina Senate Race,
1984 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1985) 104-05.
" Jesse Helms, When Free Men Shall Stand (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976) 16.
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Helms's Senate Speaking
HelnDs's Senate speeches are meant to be speeches of record. Thus, they
are normally well researched and documented. They are clearly organized
and are characterized by concrete imagery and apt word choice. The lan
guage Helms uses in these speeches tends to be more formal than in his
non-Senate speeches. According to his principle legislative aide, Dr. James
Lucier, Helms's Senate speeches are prepared with an awareness that they
serve to present "the official record, the total case for a position. They are
not meant to arouse and engage an audience."'' Helms observes that his
Senate speeches are "not designed for audiences or colleagues in the Senate.
They are designed to make legislative history. They are tantamount to legal
briefs.""
When Helms first entered the Senate, he deliberately began to offer
amendments. Many of his major Senate speeches are delivered in support
of the amendments he has continually offered since first arriving in the
Senate. Typically, he has offered amendments to prohibit abortion, permit
prayer in the public schools, eliminate forced busing, or balance the budget.
By introducing amendments that enable him to seriously address issues that
concern him. Helms has hoped to accomplish three things." First, he has
hoped to raise the issue in the public mind, putting it on the public agenda.
Second, he has hoped to provide an articulate statement of his position for
public record. In so doing, he has provided like-minded advocates with a
model persuasive message that is often widely reported and reprinted. Fi
nally, he has hoped to force his colleagues in the Senate to take a clear
position and to vote on issues they might otherwise have Ignored and avoided.
The third goal, forcing his colleagues to cast a clear vote on issues they
might otherwise ignore, is of particular importance. Helms's amendments
and the strong speeches he offers in their support have demanded responses.
The resulting debates have helped to shift the public agenda to the right,
for example, on 22 January 1981, Helms again offered and spoke in support
of his amendment banning legalized abortions. He argued that abortion is
immoral. "It is not mere coincidence," he claimed, "that abortion first ap
peared as public policy In Nazi and Communist dictatorships."" He claimed
that the court decisions which, since 1973, legalized abortion, were simply
"legalized fiction, ignoring moral principles that date to antiquity."" Helms
continued, offering extensive medical evidence suggesting that life begins
at the moment of conception, and then claimed that abortion "violates the
sanctity of human life." For Helms, this issue, like many others, is one where
there is clearly a correct position, based upon Judaeo-Christian morality,
that brooks no compromise.
" Dr. James Lucier (chief legislative assistant to Senator Jesse Helms), personal in
terview, 8 July 1985.
" Helms, interview.
" This paragraph is based on the author's interviews with Senator Helms and Dr.
James Lucier, his chief legislative assistant, who also serves as one of his principle
political advisors.
" Jesse Helms, "The Right to Life," Congressional Record 127 (1981): S571.
" Helms, "Right" 5572.
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Helms's use of amendments to introduce issues and well documented,
clearly organized, vividly worded speeches to support his positions on those
issues has allowed him to choose his opponents and to select the grounds
on which the game will be played. As Elizabeth Drew observed early in his
Senate career, Helms's amendments and the votes they force are designed
to "set up" other senators.'^ Those votes became Issues in reelection cam
paigns. The political action committees of the Right, including Helms's
Congressional Club, which supports conservative candidates, utilize the votes
that Helms has forced in taking on incumbent senators directly in their own
home states. As Drew notes, in the past a senator might have helped to raise
funds for the nominee of his party in other states, but rarely would a senator
have directly attacked another incumbent or gone to the lengths that Helms
does to unseat a targeted member of Congress." As one Democratic senator
has noted, "what he has accomplished by doing that (offering and defending
amendments] day after day, year after year, was build right wing support
that comes back to haunt the other Senators."'®
In effect. Helms has extended his disassociative rhetoric to the arena of
direct political action. Prior to Helms, no senator had ever engaged so ex
tensively in disassociative political tactics toward fellow senators. Helms's
disassociative political tactics, like his disassociative rhetoric, is a direct con
sequence of the centrality of his religious beliefs to his perceptions of public
policy.
Shortly after Helms had entered the Senate, the Raleigh News and Observer
nicknamed him "Senator No," because he so often stood alone. Today,
Helms rarely stands alone. Approximately twenty members of the Senate
Identify themselves as conservatives, and many liberals are voting (ess liberally
and more conservatively in recent years than they did in the early 1970s.
Helms's initial willingness to force issues by the introduction of amendments,
and then to ardently defend his position, is best explained by one of his staff
members who suggests that Helms acts because "it is the right thing to do.""
Whether it is "the right thing to do" remains to be seen. But certainly Helms
has been animated by strong religious beliefs in developing a conscious long-
term strategy designed to shift the public agenda to the right and to identify
those members of the Senate who do not think as he does. Clearly, Helms's
disassociative rhetoric goes beyond words and extends to the development
and implementation of political tactics designed to unequivocably disasso
ciate Helms and those senators who are "right" from those senators who
are "wrong."
Helms's Political Jeremiads
Outside the Senate, Jesse Helms is one of the more sought-after speakers
in the United States. Typically, in a noncampaign year, he delivers about two
speeches a week, though on occasion, such as during Memorial Day week
" Elizabeth Drew, "Jesse Helms," The New Yorker 20 July 1981: 83.
" Drew 83.
" Unnamed senator quoted in Drew 81.
" Hamrick, interview.
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of 1985, he has delivered as many as nine speeches a week." Helms utilizes
ghostwriters and receives aid in preparing both his Senate and non-Senate
addresses. However, he maintains full control over his speeches. His back
ground as a journalist and media commentator Is far stronger than that of
his staff, who tend to be subject matter experts. Hence, he typically makes
very substantial revisions of language, even in what his staff anticipates to
be final texts. As one of his principle ghostwriters has noted, "the Senator's
standards of style are high. He is not too happy with others."'^
Helms's non-Senate speeches are delivered primarily to sympathetic au
diences of conservative supporters. They are consistent In theme with those
he delivers in the Senate. Even so, they differ markedly from his Senate
addresses in several respects. First, they are not as thoroughly documented
and evidenced as his Senate speeches are. Helms tends to rely more heavily
on extended examples, striking analogies, and humor when he speaks outside
the Senate. Additionally, his language is more informal. Helms claims that
these distinctions are deliberate and reflect his attempts to adapt to his
audiences." His principle ghostwriters concur, noting that they draw a clear
distinction between Senate and non-Senate speeches."
Helms's non-Senate speeches are often jeremiads or jeremiad-like. The
distinctive features of the jeremiad have been examined by a variety of
scholars, and most acknowledge that the jeremiad has five major charac
teristics." First, the jeremiad involves an attempt to make the individual
members of the audience aware of themselves as part of a special or "chosen"
people. Second, the jeremiad places great stress on the urgency and timeli
ness of the problem it seeks to remedy. Third, the jeremiad contains a
condemnation of present society. The Puritan minister would recite the
sins of his followers. Secular leaders will condemn the actions of many of
their followers. Fourth, the jeremiad contains a proposal or suggestions for
resolving the problem. For the Puritan minister, that proposal was normally
a return to the paths of righteousness. For the secular orator, that proposal
will involve calling upon his audience to return to the values and traditions
that have made them a select or chosen people. Finally, speakers close their
jeremiads by sharing their vision of a bright future with their audiences of
the chosen.
Jesse Helms's addresses outside the United States Senate, given primarily
to groups of conservative supporters, often evidence the jeremiad form.
Helms acknowledges that he does utilize the jeremiad form and that many
^ Hamrick, interview.
" Lucier, interview.
" Helms, interview,
^ This statement is based on interviews with Helms's staff members Hamrick and
Lucier, who are both involved with his speech preparation.
" The characteristics of the jeremiad discussed in the remainder of this paper are
drawn from several sources including Sacavan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad
(Madison; U of Wisconsin P, 1978), 4-17; Ronald Carpenter, "The Historical Jeremiad
as Rhetorical Genre," Form and Genre Shaping Rhetorical Action, ed. Karlyn Kohrs
Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Falls Church: Speech Communication Assn.,
n.d.) 103-05; and Perry Miller, The New England Mind From Colony to Province (Boston:
Beacon, 1953) 27-33.
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of his speeches are jeremiad-iike. He notes, however, that his use of the
jeremiad is unconscious." Similarly, his principles ghostwriter feels that to
say many of Helms's speeches are jeremiads "is a fair description," but he
adds that using the jeremiad form is "nothing done consciously."" Another
of his aides indicates that "the [jeremiad] pattern fits many of his speeches.""
Though Helms's use of the jeremiad form is unconscious it should not be
surprising to find that the rhetorical form which he often uses is rooted in
the sermons of early America. In such speeches as his basic campaign speech,
delivered throughout North Carolina during his hotly contested 1984 reelec
tion campaign against Governor James Hunt; his addresses to the Conser
vative Caucus and the Conservative Political Action Committee, delivered
in 1984; his Commencement Address delivered at Grove City College in
1982; and his 1980 address to the Republican National Convention, his first
nationally televised address. Helms has repeatedly utilized the jeremiad form."
In each of these speeches, Helms claims that Americans are a "chosen
people"—chosen, as he said campaigning throughout North Carolina in
1984, because of "our commitment as a people to free enterprise and to
liberty and the fundamental Judaeo-Christian moral principles which guided
the creation of our Republic."" But though Americans are a chosen and
select people. Helms finds that "we have lost our sense of perspective over
the last 20 years" and hence face urgent problems." Then, depending on
the audience and the issue he wishes to address, he details a problem or
group of problems, such as our loss of military supremacy, our economic
plight, the legalization of abortion, or court-mandated busing, all of which
he claims have reached urgent crisis proportions in recent years.
Like the Puritan ministers of old who condemned their followers for cre
ating and contributing to problems by falling from the paths of righteousness,
Helms condemns liberal politicians, the unrestrained court system, the liberal
press specifically, and all Americans, including his audiences of sympathizers,
in general, stating, as he told the graduates in his 1962 commencement
" Helms, interview. The author described the five principle characteristics of the
jeremiad to Helms, as they have been described in this study, and asked if he utilized
this form. Helms also observed that he had no doubt been exposed to many jeremiads
when he had attended church twice weekly in his youth, as well as since that time.
" Lucier, interview. The procedure described in note 25 was employed in this
interview.
" Hamrick, interview. The procedure described in note 25 was employed in this
interview.
" "Basic Campaign Speech—1984 Senate Campaign" with slight variation delivered
repeatedly throughout N. Carolina, Apr.-Nov. 1984; typescript made available to the
author by Helms's Senate office. "Remarks to the Tenth Anniversary Dinner, Con
servative Caucus," Washington, D.C., 29 Nov. 1984, in Grassroots; The Leadership Quar
terly of the Conservative Caucus 9 (1985): 2-4. "Address to the Conservative Political
Action Committee," Washington, D.C., 1 Mar. 1984; typescript made available to the
author by Helms's Senate office. "The Uniting of the Silent Majority-Commencement
Address, Grove City College, " Grove City, Penn., 15 May 1982, in Vital Speeches of
the Day 48 (1982): 553-55. "Address to the Republican National Convention," Detroit,
Mich., 17 July 1980; typescript made available to the author by Helms's Senate office.
" Helms, "Basic Campaign" 1.
" Helms, "Basic Campaign" 2. Similarly, see Helms, "The Uniting" 554.
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address at Grove City College, "I presume to ask you, on this very special
day to consider the proposition that we become part of what we condone.""
Americans, including the very groups from which Helms draws his support,
have for too long tolerated and condoned, he continues, "the liberal elites
in the judiciary and in the media particularly, who have carried on for the
past three decades a ferocious assault on the fundamental institution of the
family."^- Thus, for Helms, specific liberal groups can be identified as par
ticularly "sinful" and hence as obvious targets of disassociative rhetoric.
Helms then presents a proposal or suggestions for resolving the problems
he addresses. Invariably, Helms's solutions involve a return to the Judaeo-
Christian moral principles upon which America was founded. To resolve our
problems, he told North Carolina voters in 1984, "we need only to ponder
the history of mankind—history as old as the Bible, or as contemporary as
the counsel of our founding fathers." Whether it is a hard line in dealing
with the Soviet Union, a reduction in federal taxing and spending, or the
passage of amendments to prevent abortion or to allow prayer in public
schools. Helms consistently casts his solutions as the result of the logical
application of basic Judaeo-Chrlstian principles to contemporary problems."
To reject Helms's solutions, in his eyes, is to reject America's religious her
itage. Helms can scarcely be expected to identify with individuals who reject
that heritage. Indeed, he must disassociate from them.
Conclusions
Baker and Fadely have focused on the ways in which Senator jesse Helms
employs the principles of identification. They have illustrated that he relies
heavily on disassociative rhetoric, or as they term it, a negative form of
identification. Such an observation is both valid and insightful; it helps to
provide an explanation of the success of polarizing figures such as Helms.
This study has attempted to build on Baker and Fadely's work by viewing
Helms's disassociative rhetoric as a sign or manifestation of something much
more fundamental to his speaking: his conscious and deliberate decisions
to let his perceptions of America's judaeo-Christian heritage dictate his
positions on public policy and shape both his Senate and non-Senate speak
ing.
When an individual speaks out of fundamental religious convictions, as
does Helms, he cannot compromise. He cannot identify, even to a small
degree, with his foes. Rather, he must disassociate himself from them. Amer
ica witnessed that fact most vividly during the years from 1830 to 1860, when
abolitionist speakers justified their positions on public policy as the logical
application of Judaeo-Christian religious principles to public issues. Well
before the Civil War, abolitionists were calling on the free states to disas
sociate themselves from the Union rather than to remain associated with
the slave states. When individuals perceive that they are speaking God-given
" Helms, "The Uniting" 553.
" Helms, "The Uniting" 554.
" See, for examples, any speech cited in note 28.
" Helms, "Address to the Republican" 6.
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truth and that their foes are entirely in error, disassociative rhetoric is a
logical rhetorical tactic. Indeed, such speakers might not be able to live with
themselves and their supporters unless they utilize disassociative rhetoric.
Richard M. Weaver concluded his remarkable essay, "Language is Ser-
monic," by observing that
no one can live a life of direction and purpose without some scheme of
values, the rhetorician is a preacher to us, noble if he tries to direct our
passion towards noble ends and base if he uses our passion to confuse and
degrade us.^^
Jesse Alexander Helms has relied on his perceptions of America's Judaeo-
Christian heritage to shape his positions on contemporary American issues
and his speaking on behalf of those positions. Consequently, we can un
derstand why he employs disassociative rhetoric more than most speakers
do and why he has become the most conspicuous secular preacher of the
religious right. Only time will fully enable us to understand whether he has
directed our passion towards noble ends or used our passion to confuse and
degrade us.
" Richard M. Weaver, Language is Sermonfc, ed. Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard
Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1970) 225.
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FIAT POWER AND THE MIRROR
STATE COUNTERPLAN
Dean Fadely
The theoretical perspectives of intercollegiate debate are still shifting, and
the various strategies and tactics for use in convincing judges still need
continual evaluation. The mirror state counterplan is a relatively old, simple,
and straightforward form of negative refutation. Many years ago It consti
tuted the typical, almost traditional, form of negative counterproposal. It
was valid as a form of negative refutation then, and it remains so today.
Several years ago, a colleague and I argued that
The theoretical perspectives of intercollegiate debate constantly shift. One
of the most notable fluctuations of the past decade concerns changing af
firmative case constructs. Developing from the stock issues case, has been
the comparative advantages case, the utilities case, and the cost benefits
analysis case. In addition to these approaches, affirmative teams utilize goals
cases, criteria cases, and alternative justification cases, thereby providing them
with various strategies and tactics for use in convincing judges. In tight of the
increasing options open to the affirmative, a necessity arises to reconsider
the various strategies open to the negative.'
Richard H. Dempsey and David J. Hartmann have undertaken such a re
consideration in their recently published article entitled "Mirror State Coun-
terplans; Illegitimate, Topical, or Magical?"^ The purpose of this essay is to
evaluate the mirror state counterplan both generally and in light of the
criticisms leveled against it by Dempsey and Hartmann. Specifically, 1 will
advance three major arguments: (1) mirror state counterplans can fulfill the
general requirements that negative counterproposals must meet; (2) mirror
state counterplans can fulfill the particular requisites inherent in this type
of policy option; and (3) the recent criticisms of the mirror state counterplan
by Dempsey and Hartmann rest on interrelated misconceptions concerning
the nature of fiat power.
Mirror state counterplans are not new. They were in use when I debated
in high schoi—a time period that, contrary to the rumors started by some
of my students, did not interface with the Lincoln-Douglas debates but that
did precede the Kennedy-Nixon debates. The basic notion underlying mirror
Dean Fadely, Ph.D., The University of Pittsburgh, is an Associate Professor
in the Division of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina
at Greensboro.
' M. Gordon Widenhouse and Dean Fadely, "Negative Constructs: A Perspective,"
Debate Issues XI (Jan. 1978): 9-13.
' Journal of the American Forensic Association XXI (Winter 1985): 161-66. Other articles
that have undertaken this reconsideration while treating issues relevant to this dis
cussion include the following: Robert Branham, "The Counterplan as Disadvantage,"
Speaker and Cave/ XVI (Summer 1979): 61-66; and Michel E. Mayer and jerold Hall,
"Evaluating the Studies Counterplan: Topicality and Competitiveness," Speaker and
Cave/ XVI (Summer 1979); 67-72.
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state counterplans can be expressed in a single statement: Let the states do
it. The fundamental idea is that each state can enact a miniature version of
an affirmative plan—the latter to be adopted on the federal level. For ex
ample, the 1981-82 national debate proposition was "Resolved: That the
federal government should significantly curtail the powers of labor unions
in the United States." A mirror state counterplan would call for the states
to significantly curtail the powers of labor unions within their borders. With
this definition in mind, let us turn to the first argument: mirror state coun
terplans can fulfil! the general requirements that negative counterproposals
must meet.
Traditionally, debate theory has held that regardless of the specific res
olution under consideration, a negative counterplan must meet certain re
quirements if it is to be prima facie. In other words, there are resolutionally
invariant requisites for a negative counterproposal. While the exact termi
nology for these requirements varies among theorists, they are usually known
as: (1) nontopicaiity, (2) mutual exclusivity, and (3) superiority.^-'
The first two characteristics, nontopicaiity and mutual exclusivity, are log
ical consequences of the major mandate under which all negative teams
operate: the duty of the negative is to deny the resolution. Because the first
duty of the negative is to deny the resolution, the counterproposal must be
nontopical. Obviously, if the counterplan is topical, the negative is sup
porting, not denying, the resolution. Similarly, the counterplan must be
mutually exclusive from the policy option advocated by the affirmative team.
The judge(s) must have to choose between, or even among, the competing
policies. If the judgefs) could vote for all of the policies advocated in a given
debate, including the counterplan, in a rational manner,' then the negative
team would have failed to meet its primary responsibility of denying the
resolution; additionally, the affirmative team would have achieved its primary
obligation of upholding the resolution.
While the third characteristic of a counterproposal—superiority—is not,
in my opinion, as essential or as universally agreed upon^' as the first two, it
is nevertheless important. As has been argued:
'Widenhouse and Fadely: Allan ). Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A General
Theory of the Counterplan," Advanced Debate Readings in Theory, Practice, and Teach
ing, ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie: National Textbook, 1979) 200-12; Austin ). Freeley,
Argumentation and Debate: Reasoned Decision Making (Beimont: Wadsworth, 1981) 211-
16; Maridell Fryar and David A. Thomas, Basic De6afe(Lincolnwood: National Textbook,
1983), 88-90; and Theodore F. Sheckels, Jr., Debating Applied Rhetorical Theory {New
York: Longman, 1984) 157-61,207-10. For a slightly different interpretation, see Sand
ers, who, although he admits "some variance with other writers in this area," takes a
similar position. Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate
(Prospect Heights: Waveland, 1983) 107-15.
' The important phrase to remember is "in a rational manner." If the negative
counterplan alone is better than either the affirmative plan alone or the negative
counterplan plus the affirmative plan, then it would not be a rational decision to vote
for either the affirmative plan alone or the negative counterproposal plus the affirma
tive plan.
' For example, see J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1983) 218. Also see Freeley, 4th ed. 219.
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Some theorists argue that the counterplan must be superior to the affirma
tive proposal.^ The rationale for this position hinges on the notion that, if
the affirmative plan is as good as the counterplan, then the resolution has
not been defeated and the negtive should lose. Although it seems hypo
thetical that a debate involving two explicit policy systems could end in a
virtual tie, if that did occur, the presumption should rest with which ever
proposal involves less risk. Thus, the negative counterplan should be superior
in some way, albeit less risk, to the affirmative proposal.'
The question now arises: Can a mirror state counterplan meet these three
basic requirements? To help answer this query, let us focus on the issue of
nontopicality and hypothesize that two teams are debating the proposition
"Resolved: That the federal government should abolish laws regulating the
manufacture, sale, distribution, and possession of obscene and/or porno
graphic material(s)." The affirmative argues that such action should be taken
and, logically, proposes a constitutional amendment to expand the scope of
the first amendment so that heretofore obscene and/or pornographic ma
terials) become protected as free speech. Such an amendment would over
turn Supreme Court decisions such as Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I and
would render unconstitutional laws such as comstock. In response, the neg
ative team can argue that the abolution should be effected not by the af
firmative plan but by the actions of the states. Because the affirmative team
has operationally defined the resolution in terms of a constitutional amend
ment, and, because the agent of action is the federal government, the neg
ative counterplan constitutes a clear denial of the resolution."
Thus, the negative counterplan is nontopical. Austin J. Freeley supports
this topicality analysis:
The negative may establish that its counterplan is nonpropositional (or non-
topical) In a number of ways, it may argue that the counterplan should be
carried out by a different level of government than that called for in the
resolution (e.g., the state rather than the federal government should do it.)*
Negative teams can achieve mutual exclusivity for their policy option in
several ways. They may use the funding needed to implement the affirmative
proposal for their plan. They may usurp the affirmative team's funding mech
anisms. They may exploit a time lag by which it is impossible to implement
the affirmative proposal as quickly as the negative counterplan. Thus, when
the judge(s) vote at the end of the round, the negative plan is Implemented
first and, arguendo, the need for the affirmative policy is obviated. Depending
on the particulars of the resolution being debated and on the provisions of
* In addition to the sources cited in footnotes 3 and 4, see the following: Glenn R.
Capp and Thelma Robuck Capp, Principles of Argumentation and Debate (Englewood
Cliffs, N.I.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) 50-52; Wayne C. Eubank, "Developing the Case,"
Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices, ed. James H. McBath (New York:
Holt, 1963) 113-16; Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn, 1968)
108; and Wayne N. Thompson, Modern Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Prac
tices (New York: Harper, 1971) 88-92.
'Widenhouse and Fadely 12.
" I would argue that even if the resolution did not specify an agent of action, the
negative team, depending on the particulars of the debate, could propose a sound
mirror state counterplan.
'Freeley 211-12.
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the mirror state counterplan, all three of the options, as well as others, are
available.
As previously indicated, negative debaters often try to achieve counterplan
superiority by proving that the negative counterproposal entails less risk
than the affirmative policy option. Freeley cites the following example:
... on the "consumer product safety" proposition, negatives using a "states"
counterplan argued that the states rather than the federal government should
regulate a particular consumer product—if a plan turned out to be undesir
able, less harm would be done on a statewide basis than if the plan were
nationwide. If the plan turned out to be desirable, then other states would
adopt it.'"
It would appear, then, that taken at face value, a mirror state counterplan
can fulfill the three basic requirements that all negative counterplans must
meet. The question now arises: Can a mirror state counterplan fulfill any
specialized requirements inherent in this specific type of counterproposal?
The major requirement for a mirror state counterplan would appear to
be that the action(s) of the states must be arguably able to achieve the results
of the affirmative proposal. This requirement is resolutionally variant. Some
times the national proposition obviously lends itself to a mirror state coun
terplan approach; the previous examples of the 1976-77 consumer product
safety topic and the 1981-82 labor union topic are cases in point. Sometimes
the wording of the national resolution precludes, or at least militates against,
the use of a mirror state counterplan. For example, I cannot envision a mirror
state counterplan on either the 1974-75 proposition "Resolved: That the
power of the presidency should be significantly curtailed" or the 1977-78
resolution "That law enforcement agencies should be given significantly
greater freedom in the investigation and/or prosecution of felony crimes.""
However, that a mirror state counterplan is resolutionally variant in no way
denies its theoretical validity. This observation concerns a practical, not a
theoretical, limitation.
We have so far concluded that the mirror state counterplan can fulfill the
general requirements which all negative counterproposals must meet as well
as the particular requirements of this type of counterplan. We are now ready
to consider the third major argument of our essay—that Dempsey and Hart-
mann's recent criticisms of the mirror state counterplan rest on Interrelated
misconceptions concerning the nature of fiat power.
In the gamelike world of competitive tournament debating, fiat power is
simply another rule of the game. In the real world, it would be impossible
" Freeley 212.
" I am not always in agreement with Arthur Schopenhauer's rather cynical obser
vation that "every man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the
world." My inability to envision a mirror state counterplan on these propositions does
not rule out the possibility that the more creative and imaginative mind of an inter
collegiate debater could not generate one. However, for the sake of discussion, I am
willing to stipulate that some national resolutions preclude the use of mirror state
counterplans, and I cite two instances that I consider to be examples of such preclusion.
" David A. Ling and Robert V. Seltzer, "The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Con
temporary Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association VII (Spring 1971): 278-
83. See especially 280.
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for two college students, let alone two high school students, to Implement
the policies that an affirmative team calls for in its plan. Because, in actuality,
the plan could not be implemented, It could not be thoroughly analyzed
and evaluated. Therefore, the processes and merits of competitive tourna
ment debate would be thwarted. To solve this problem, the idea of fiat
power has evolved.
Fiat power Is the power to say hypothetically or for the sake of argument
that the affirmative plan has been implemented. Under this stipulation, the
negative team can more easily debate on another area of clash—the results
of the plan. While fiat power enables debaters to pretend, there are limi
tations on the pretense—common sense limitations designed to improve
the quality of competitive debating. For example, the affirmative team cannot
fiat the physically impossible, let us say, a magic wand to cure the ills of the
world. This limitation, which has been referred to as "the scope of could,""
holds that what an affirmative advocates and fiats must be within the realm
of physical possibility. That is, it could happen. This does not mean that it
would happen or even that it is likely to happen. It means only that It is
theoretically possible for the advocated proposal to be implemented. Ob
viously it is futile to debate magic wands and mystical cures; thus, neither
side can fiat these. Similarly, neither side can fiat away problems associated
with the policy options they have espoused—problems such as the lack of
solvency or the presence of disadvantages.
Gerald H. Sanders gives a straightforward explication of fiat power:
Another right of the affirmative that is important is the power of fiat. This
means that the affirmative can mandate the implementation of their proposal.
Remember that all debate resolutions contain the word "should" in them.
If the negative were to be able to argue legitimately that the affirmative plan
will never be adopted by congress, for instance, the entire debate could
revolve around this issue and you would never consider the substance of the
issues involved. In fact, the negative could be admitting attitudinal inherency
if they argued in this manner. However, in order to preclude this possibility,
the affirmative can fiat their proposal into existence, in other words, they
only have to argue that the proposal "should" be adopted, not that it "would"
be adopted. This is why a negative argument like the one mentioned above
is called a "should-would" argument and is not legitimate in academic de
bate." Let me hasten to add that the affirmative is limited to fiating their
program into existence. They cannot fiat solvency. Also, the negative can
argue some of the reasoning behind congress' attitude against the affirmative
proposal. There may be the source of some good disadvantages here. How
ever, an argument that simply states that congress will not adopt the proposal
is overcome by the affirmative fiat power."
" In discussing a should-would argument, H. Francis Short states that "... when
the affirmative argues that its proposition should be accepted, it does not have to
defend the would argument. Its plan assumes the nature of a fiat." H. Francis Short,
"Affirmative Case Building," Introduction to Debate, ed. Carolyn Keefe, Thomas B.
Harte, and Laurence E. Norton (New York: Macmillan, 1982) 175. Austin j. Freeley is
even more explicit in his discussion of the illegitimacy of should-would when he
writes that "The negative team must avoid the pointless, in educational debate, 'should-
would' argument. The point is not wou/d—but sbou/d—the affirmative proposal be
adopted" (emphasis Freeley's). Freeley 47-48.
" Sanders 5^
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Theodore F. Sheckels, Jr., supplies a similar analysis of fiat power without
restricting it to any one side:
The word "should" appears often in policy resolutions. I have not treated it
as a key term in need of definition because its definition in debating is fairly
standardized. "Should" means "ought to but not necessarily will." This stan
dardized definition implies two important conventions of debate: (1) that the
team advocating the resolution does not have to show it will be adopted; (2)
that the team advocating the resolution does not have to show that a Con
stitutional amendment will be passed by Congress and ratified by the requisite
number of states if an amendment is necessary for the presented or implied
policy to take effect. Both of these conventions are subsumed under the
term "fiat power." The team advocating a policy is permitted to command
or "fiat" the presented or implied policy into operation, bypassing, as it were,
the necessary legislative actions. This convention has long been observed in
debating so that attention will be directed toward the merits of the resolution,
not the political dimensions any presented or implied policy possesses. Be
ginning debaters need to know about this convention so that they do not
waste time discussing whether Congress will or will not pass a policy.^^
Fryar and Thomas give a succinct summary of the concept, defining fiat
An assumed power to put a proposal into effect; a legal mandate binding on
the parties involved, overriding their personal attitudes. Debaters are allowed
to say their proposals are to be implemented "by fiat" for the sake of avoiding
quibbles over whether, in the real world, such proposals could be expected
to receive approval. Fiat power is limited to matter subject to law; it is not a
"magic wand" to avoid substantive argument. For example, an energy bill
could be adopted by fiat, but a new oil supply cannot be discovered by fiat.^*
Dempsey and Hartmann misanalyze the nature of fiat power: (1) they
confuse should with would (some attendant strawperson argumentation aris
es from this confusion), and (2) they misanalyze authoritative testimony re
garding the nature of fiat.
Dempsey and Hartmann confuse should with would. For example, in dis
cussing the mirror state counterplan, they assert that "all fifty states simply
won't adopt laws on their own."'' They then conclude that because the
states won't adopt such laws, a negative debate team cannot legitimately
propose such a counterplan. Maybe all fifty states would adopt uniform
laws on their own if the reasons for doing so were rationally compelling. I
will address this idea subsequently. However, whether the states would or
would not adopt laws is not the major issue to be considered. In terms of
competitive tournament debate, the issue is whether they should, not whether
they would. Dempsey and Hartmann commit a should-would error. They
ignore a central aspect of fiat power. In the words of Sheckels, previously
noted, "the team advocating a policy is permitted to command or 'fiat' the
presented or implied policy into operation, bypassing, as it were, the nec
essary legislative actions."" Likewise, the negative can bypass the necessary
legislative actions in their counterplan. To argue that the legislative actions
" Sheckeis 14.
" Fryar and Thomas 198.
" Dempsey and Hartmann 162.
'• Dempsey and Hartmann 162.
" Sheckels 14.
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would not happen and therefore that the negative counterplan would not
eventuate, clearly lies outside the limits of contest debating.
Furthermore, Dempsey and Hartmann's idea of uniform laws is a straw-
person argument. All fifty states have adopted laws against actions such as
arson, murder, and rape. While it is true that these laws vary from state to
state, this variance is relatively unimportant. The laws vary because each state
legislature, acting rationally (we hope), passed variants of the law that, in
their opinion, were best-suited for the problems and social values of its state.
If the problems and societal values of all the states were as uniform as the
problems and societal values argued in a first affirmative constructive, the
probability of uniform state laws would be increased. Furthermore, if there
were overriding reasons for uniform state laws, if uniform state laws should
be passed, if such laws were indeed logically desirable, then the probability
of the passage of uniform laws, by state legislatures, would be greater.
The important issue to be considered is not whether the laws are uniform
but whether the laws are solvent. Laws vary from state to state neither
because of a plot to reduce the effectiveness of jurisprudence nor because
of accident. Laws vary from state to state because, in the opinion of state
lawmakers, a specific version of a law is more appropriate for their state.
State lawmakers believe that the individuality of state laws increases their
solvency. Thus, Dempsey and Hartmann assume, without proof, that non-
uniform but similar state laws could not be used in a mirror state counterplan.
They assume that such laws would not be solvent because they are not
identical.
Dempsey and Hartmann further assume that states would not pass uniform
laws even if it were in their interest to do so. However, they do cite evidence
suggesting that states have profited from non-uniform laws and that it is
therefore in the rational self-interest of states to enact such laws.^" If the
rationale for any course of action were as great as the typical first affirmative
constructive, i.e., mounds of dead bodies, or mounds of injured, wounded,
maimed, and bleeding bodies, or economic loss, or even the potential for
any or all of the above, then that course of action would, we hope, be
adopted by rational lawmakers, albeit rational lawmakers representing fifty
states. Dempsey and Hartmann, in short, ignore what some theorists have
referred to as "the inherent and compelling need."^^
In addition to confusing should with would and engaging in strawperson
argumentation, Dempsey and Hartmann make several other statements that
indicate some confusion either about the nature of fiat or about their re
search methods. For example, they cite Austin J. Freeley extensively on the
nature of fiat power:
Freeley (1981) like others, limits fiat power by noting that it cannot extend
to 'unreasonable' provisions and that the plans are subject to the normal
political processes associated with the agent of action."
" Dempsey and Hartmann 162.
For example, see Robert P. Newman, "The Inherent and Compelling Need,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association II (May 1965): 66-71.
" Dempsey and Hartmann 161. The inclusion of the words "associated with the
agent of action" is apparently Dempsey and Hartmann's, for these words do not appear
on page 167—or on page 168, for that matter—of Freeley's text.
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Dempsey and Hartmann then assert that "negatives typically Implement
mirror counterplans"" in ways that are unreasonable and not "subject to
the normal political processes.""
A comparison of the actual statement in Freeley's text with Dempsey and
Hartmann's paraphrase leads me to believe that Freeley's meaning of "un
reasonable" and "normal political processes" is different from the meaning
inferred by Dempsey and Hartmann. The following is the complete quotation
from Freeley. The italicized words are those cited by Dempsey and Hart
mann:
Affirmatives may flat reasonable provisions for their plan. For instance, they
may stipulate that their administrative body be bipartisan or nonpartisan; they
may stipulate geographic representation; they may provide that members of
the body be lawyers, physicians, or accountants or meet various professional
standards. Indeed, they may stipulate anything for which there is a reasonable
warrant or relevant analogy.
Affirmatives may not, however, fiat unreasonable provisions for their plan.
For instance, in a debate on consumer protection, the affirmatives may not
fiat that their administrative body will be headed by Ralph Nader; in a debate
on crime control, they may not fiat that the members of their administrative
body will be incorruptible, if they designate a Congressional committee to
investigate the CIA, they may not fiat that all of the members will be left-
wing Democrats. In short, the affirmative plan is subject to normal political
processes and its members are subject to normal human frailties. The affirma
tive may not appoint "Jesus Christ Superstar" to its administrative body and
stipulate that miracles will be passed to overcome attitudinal inherency and
any other problems that block the status quo from functioning in a state of
perfection.''
My interpretation of this passage is that the term "normal political processes"
essentially means the possible. "Unreasonable" provisions are provisions
that, by Freeley's examples, are impossible to guarantee other than by the
use of fiat power, which would constitute a petitio principii. Certainly nothing
in Freeley's text condemns mirror state counterplans; rather, as has been
indicated, Freeley specifically holds that the negative may argue them.'^ This
latter fact also seems to indicate that Dempsey and Hartmann misanalyze or
misapply Professor Freeley's treatment of fiat power and the counterplan.
They then use this misanalysis to argue against a legitimate form of negative
argumentation—the mirror state counterplan.
The theoretical perspectives of intercollegiate debate are stili shifting, and
the various strategies and tactics used to convince judges still need continual
evaluation. The mirror state counterplan is a relatively old, simple, and
straightforward form of negative refutation. Many years ago it constituted,
in my opinion, the typical, almost traditional, form of negative counterpro
posal. Certainly the mirror state counterplan is no less valid today than it
was in that era presaging the Kennedy-Nixon debates.
" Dempsey and Hartmann 161. Also see 163.
" Dempsey and Hartmann 161-64.
" Freeley 167-68.
Freeley is not alone in explicitly stating the legitimacy of mirror state counterplans.
Sanders also indicates that the use of a mirror state counterplan is a legitimate line of
negative refutation, although he suggests that it, along with the conditional counter-
plan, the hypothetical counterplan, and the studies counterplan, constitutes "poor
strategy in academic debate." Sanders 111-12.
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TOWARD A THEORY OF CONTEMPORARY
DEBATE
Kent R. Colbert
East Tennessee State University
Thomas R. King
Florida State University
The intercollegiate debate community has been divided into two seg
ments. The first supports the National Debate Tournament (NOT) style, which
has been the norm since the mid-1940s. The second backs the Cross Ex
amination Debate Association (CEDA) style, which emerged as an alternative
to the former in the mid seventies. Some critics have suggested that the two
styles are drastically different, while others maintain that they are simply
different perspectives for discussing various topics. This essay proposes that
the two types of intercollegiate debate are contemporary manifestations of
classical rhetorical traditions. Specifically, the arguments of NDT debate pro
ponents reflect many of the principles that Plato defended in his system of
dialectics; and the reasonings of CEDA debate supporters are similar to many
of the fundamentals that Aristotle defended in The Rhetoric. Our purpose is
not to suggest that the similarities between Plato and NDT or CEDA and
Aristotle are causal, intentional, or perfectly consistent. Rather, observing
that over sixty percent of the debate community competes apart from the
other segment, we attempt to answer this question: Was CEDA's rejection
of NDT an intellectual conversion that mirrors Aristotle's rejection of Plato?
In this essay, we first review the theoretical and empirical literature con
cerning the differences and similarities between NDT and CEDA. Second,
we suggest that NDT debate and Platonic philosophies are similar ideolog
ically. And third, we suggest that CEDA debate and the Aristotelian models
are similar.
Since its inception, the NDT has had a profound impact on the style of
intercollegiate debate. The NDT's influence is so evident that the acronym
NDT Style has been widely used to describe the approach and methods used
by intercollegiate debaters. Williams has noted that the NDT influences
debate practices via a "trickle-down" effect (5).
In recent years, some critics have asserted that NDT debate has evolved
into an activity in which vocal delivery Is sacrificed for strategic advantage.
Brooks argued that "... NDT judges have failed to demand that debaters
speak at a rate that allows the arguments and evidence to be presented,
understood, and considered within the format of the oral presentation" (14).
Research has confirmed Brooks's assertion that NDT speaking rates have
increased significantly (Colbert 18). Other critics have complained that the
activity places too much emphasis on evidence and that, consequently, anal
ysis and persuasion are not given sufficient attention. Hollihan, Riley, and
Austin explained that the Cross Examination Debate Association "... was
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created [in the early 1970s] because Howe and his colleagues believed that
NOT debate was failing in its educational mission. Debaters were speaking
too quickly, reading too much evidence, and relying on jargon that could
not be understood by anyone except trained debate judges" (872). Disen
chanted by the style of NDT debate, several debate coaches saw CEDA as
an alternative to NDT debate.
Those debate coaches who held similar convictions about what intercol
legiate debate should be began to sponsor CEDA competition. According
to one source, "Any debate tournament director may request permission
to sponsor a CEDA division in which the CEDA topic must be used in a
cross-examination format, and points may be acquired toward a national
sweepstakes ranking at the end of the year. CEDA is governed by an Executive
Council, which conducts its own selection of national topic, one to be used
In each half of the debate season. In the school year 1979-1980,146 colleges
competed in one or more CEDA tournaments" (Norton 20). Ingalls reported
that "CEDA has 285 member institutions Most of its gains were at the
expense of NDT, which suffered a decline in membership into the early
1980's... (15).
Perhaps the most important implication concerning the departure from
the NDT style of debate was the philosophical standpoint of the creators of
CEDA.
... CEDA has strived to be different from NDT debate.... what has made
CEDA diffrent from NDT ... is not the format or the type of proposition
used, but rather the primary goals and organizing principles of the organi
zation. The CEDA community was united by the conviction that NDT did
not serve as an appropriate argumentative laboratory. In short, the propo
nents of CEDA debate shared a vision of proper orientation for an intercol
legiate debate program (Hollihan, Riley, and Austin 871).
Some CEDA proponents charged that NDT had failed to meet its edu
cational mission (Hollihan, Riley, and Austin), jack Howe, the founder of
CEDA debate, explained that "CEDA debate is at variance with NDT debate
in three major aspects: (1) in its attitude toward evidence; (2) in delivery
techniques and (3) in its emphasis on an audience-oriented approach to
debate" (1). Thomas made this observation: "One [CEDA] goal was to furnish
a communication-centered event, in contrast to NDT's information-pro
cessing orientation. The implications of this difference were In preferred
manners of style and delivery, along with weight placed upon evidence in
debates" (17).
In 1983, Lee, Lee, and Seeger surveyed over seventy forensics directors
and concluded that CEDA and NDT differed significantly in their perceptions
of the following: students' workload (as perceived by directors), coaching
workload, the importance of teaching good public speaking skills, rapid
delivery as the major problem with debate, too much emphasis on evidence
as the major problem with debate, and the necessity of high school expe
rience for success in competition (845-51).
The Lee, Lee, and Seeger survey demonstrated many substantial differ
ences between CEDA and NDT, perhaps most important of which was the
difference in the forensics directors' perceived educational mission. Though
speaking style and argumentative skills are not mutually exclusive and appear
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important to both NDT and CEDA participants, the relative emphasis that
different debate coaches place on these skills reflects the coaches' differing
perceptions. Lee, Lee, and Seeger offered this conclusion: "(wjhile we do
not claim that our results justify changes in practice, we will argue that more
research is warranted in order to more definitively describe and account for
some of the serious tendencies this study infers" (855).
Hollihan, Riley, and Austin argued that . . the differences between CEDA
and NDT debate should be recognized for what they are: differences In
exemplar models. CEDA debates are not substantially different from NDT
because of their quasi-value topics. They are different only to the extent
that the judges who hear the rounds perpetuate the goal of the activity by
using their ballots to teach and reward debaters who reflect the goals of
CEDA." The authors sampled ballots from a large NDT/CEDA tournament
(at the University of Utah) and concluded that .. the content analysis found
CEDA judges are more interested in delivery, speed, educational and per
sonal comments than the NDT judges, while NDT judges were more con
cerned with argument and theory issues than CEDA judges What remains
to be considered is whether or not these differences in judging behavior
are good ones" (878).
While several scholars have argued that CEDA and NDT are different,
others have contended that they are not. Rowland, for example, argued that
"The sharp distinction which many theorists have drawn between value and
policy debate is unfortunate. Values and policies are so intertwined that it
is impossible to consider one without the other. The relative worth of com
peting policies can be measured only by comparing the importance of the
values which the policies fulfill. At the same time, the relative worth of
competing values can be measured only by considering the effects which
the values would have by treating them if they were to guide human conduct.
The values can be evaluated only as implicit policies" (833). Matlon, for
instance, contended that"... values are seldom, if ever, argued in a vacuum.
They are closely intertwined with statements of fact and attitudes about
policy" (194). Vasilius concurred with this explanation: "... It is unlikely that
values could be divorced from their policy implications" (842). And Bartanen
recognizes the "inevitable and necessary interrelationships between values
and policies in political decision-making" (14). Dudczak concluded that "...
[vjalue propositions and policy propositions differ only in their beginning
points, but are otherwise necessarily connected. Values not only underlie
the justification for action, they also suggest the action itself" (842).
It is clear that the intercollegiate debate community is divided. While
similarities exist between value and policy debate—namely, in the inter
dependence of concept and application—great philosophical differences
are apparent in the teaching approaches, goals, and methods of intercol
legiate debate instructors. The fundamental difference is far from new and
is not unique to intercollegiate debate. In fact, the NDT and CEDA conflict
can be viewed as a division of dialectic and Aristotelian belief systems within
the debate community. We attempt to answer the question "Are the dif
ferences between NDT and CEDA debate fundamentally differences in clas
sical rhetorical models?" We maintain that the current division in the debate
community is similar in many ways to that which occurred in ancient Greece.
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Dialectics: The NDT Approach
Plato, who formed the dialectic school of rhetorical thought, argued that
good rhetoric is based upon knolwedge and truth. He believed that rhetori
cians must define terms and concern themselves with the arrangement of
materials. Most important, Plato was opposed to the emphasis of stylistic
and audience-centered forms of public discourse. In his classic text, The
Phaedrus, Plato communicated his position within a dialogue between Phae-
drus and Socrates.
Are you and I required to extol the speech not merely on the score of its
authors lucidity and terseness of expression, and his consistently precise and
well-polished vocabulary, but also for his having said what he ought? (Hack-
forth 32)
Wilson and Arnold suggested that Plato was concerned with the content
or truth of a message, not with its delivery. Their best summary of Plato's
position states that not all speech writing is good but that well-conceived,
well-intended speeches permeated with truth are powerful instruments and
may be employed for social and spiritual good (23). Not only was Plato
concerned that the rhetorician search for truth, but he also attacked those
who supported persuasive delivery and audience-centered philosophies. He
expressed his position in these words: "... I have heard it said that it's not
necessary for the man who plans to be an orator to learn what is really just
and true, but only what seems so to the crowd who will pass judgement;
and in the same way he may neglect what is good and beautiful and con
centrate on what will seem so; for it is from what seems to be true that
persuasion comes, not from the real truth" (Helmbold and Rabinowitz 46).
The NDT debate community tends to have similar views, according to an
analysis of their debate practices. Their concern is with content, which is
proven by their preoccupation with evidence. Jones wrote that the
"[djetermination to debate only propositions of policy is a reflection of
tradition; we tend to value or believe only those ideas supported by facts
or statistics—scientism The resulting conflict, proposition of policy vs.
proposition of value, is a prime example of the fact-value dichotomy..."
(2). Perhaps NDT's interest of argument validity is not exactly the same as
Plato's search for the truth; nevertheless, emphasizing what is said rather
than how it is said is common to both NDT and the dialectic school.
The lee. Lee, and Seeger survey revealed that perceptions of evidence
differ significantly between NDT and CEDA forensics directors. Any observer
of an NDT debate will testify that judges spend from a few to thirty minutes
after a typical debate examining evidence presented during the round (Brooks
14). This practice is sometimes followed even when the judge comprehends
that evidence, which is critically examined to weigh its validity or truth.
Hollihan, Riley, and Austin's content analysis of judges' ballots appear to be
consistent with this contention. They found that NDT judges are most con
cerned with argument and theory. Debates are often judged on the basis of
which debate team best supported the truth of its example of the resolution.
This is not to say that good speaking style is discouraged; however, the
significant increase in speaking rates in NDT debate (Colbert 18) was not
perpetuated by judges who demanded an emphasis on presentation. In short.
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the philosophies of NDT proponents are similar to Plato's perception that
what is said is more important than how it is said.
One other relationship between dialectics and NDT that warrants brief
mentioning is the discrepancy over the acceptance and perpetuation of
faster-than-normal speaking rates. Surely Plato did not support a rapid-fire
delivery. However, his concern was with experts and not with an audience
consisting of the masses. The average person on the street could not go In
and render a justifiable decision in a typical NDT debate. While this may
also be the case for some CEDA debates, the two factions have fundamentally
different underlying philosophies with regard to audience.
Aristotelian: The CEDA Approach
Aristotle, a student of Plato, was one of the greatest rhetorical theorists.
The three books of his Rhetoric are perhaps the most influential writings
about public speaking. In Baldwin's opinion, The Rhetoric, though short,
reveals the "full reach" of Aristotle's intelligence. The treatise is in three
books, or sections. According to Baldwin's classification. Book I deals with
the necessities and opportunities of the speaker. Book II with the audience,
and Book III with the speech itself. Thonssen and Baird argued that "in many
respects the Rhetoric accepts, elaborates, and systematizes doctrines set forth
in the Phaedrus. Aristotle adopted the typically Platonic principles that the
contemporary writers were treating rhetoric in an unscientific manner, that
rhetoric was closely related to dialectic, and that the orator should be con
versant with the laws of human nature as they affected the response of
hearers" (58).
In Book I, Aristotle writes about persuasion, and he contrasts popular
speaking and dialectics. He defines rhetoric as ".. . the faculty of discovering
in 3 particular case what are the available means of persuasion" (Cooper 7).
Book II discusses the audience. Wilson and Arnold wrote that Book II "...
contains discussions of how emotions affect judgements of listeners and how
such feelings as anger, love, fear, shame, benevolence, pity, and the like are
evoked by what is said . .. The influence of fortune, wealth, and power upon
human character is explored" (24). In the book of speech. Book III, Aristotle
explains that delivery "... is something we must pay attention to because
of the 'sorry nature' of the audience." On the problems of effective delivery,
however, Aristotle wrote little. When he turns to style, Aristotle discards
most of his predecessor's strictures on requisites of good style, preferring
to emphasize clarity above all else" (Wilson and Arnold 25). In short, Aristotle
emphasized persuasive approaches, audience-centered approaches, and ef
fective delivery. Although he acknowledged that rhetoric and dialectics are
counterparts, he believed that the distinctions between the two are impor
tant.
Riekeand Sillars distinguished between dialectical and rhetorical theories.
Plato reasoned that it is possible for human argument to achieve absolute
truth, and his method, accordingly, was dialectic. Furthermore, if one has
absolute truth, one does not negotiate, compromise, or even supplicate with
others. The truth is stated in the clearest possible way for those who are able
to understand.... On the other hand, Aristotle asserted that ... humans
argue about their own actions which are never inevitable and about which
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one could, therefore, never have absolute truth. He did, however, feel that
some judgements are more "probably" true than others. But dialectic alone
would be insufficient to make such judgements because of the conditional
nature of the questions and the need to enter human judgement into equa
tion. Therefore, he posited a system which would secure on each question
all that could be persuasively said (15-16).
Aristotle's rhetorical school held to many philosophies similar to those of
today's CEDA followers. Aristotle argued that rhetoric is discovering the
available means of persuasion. He advanced an audience-centered approach,
wrote about delivery, and provided an orderly structure outlining the prin
ciples of rhetoric. Thonssen and Baird explained that Aristotle acknowledged
Plato's truth but made probability an essential substructure of rhetoric (58).
Hunt argued that "Plato sought to reform life (policy-making), while Aristotle
was more interested in reorganizing theory about life. For this reason Ar
istotle's Rhetoric is largely detached from both morality and pedagogy. It is
neither a manual of rules nor a collection of injunctions. It is an unmoral
and scientific analysis of the means of persuasion (audience adaptation)" (3).
Aristotle's Rhetoric is not void of concern for truth, but its emphasis or goal
is more related to the persuasion of an audience.
The CEDA debate community seems to share views of rhetoric with Ar
istotle. The Lee, Lee, and Seeger survey, as well as the content analysis by
Hollihan, Riley, and Austin, is consistent with the conclusion that CEDA
debate follows several philosophies posited by Aristotle. Both CEDA pro
ponents and Aristotle express concern for an audience-centered approach,
proper delivery, and emphasis on style. Rieke and Sillars offered this con
clusion: "Aristotle's rhetorical system is most clearly antecedent of an au
dience-centered theory of argumentation (M)uch of Aristotle's rhetor
ical theory serves as an inspiration for an audience-centered perspective on
argumentation" (16).
Conclusions
Perhaps the underlying issue that has divided the intercollegiate debate
community is a continuation of the ancient philosophical difference over
views toward rhetoric. We do not suggest that conscious and intentional
discrepancies over classical rhetorical theories caused the current division.
However, many similar views exist between Plato's view of rhetoric and NDT
debate and between Aristotle's view of rhetoric and CEDA debate. (Inter
estingly, Plato preceded Aristotle, and NDT debate preceded CEDA debate.)
The differences between NDT and CEDA are not only philosophical; it ap
pears that the cause for the division of the intercollegiate debate community
is deeper than a preference to discuss either values or policies (the stock
explanation). Like Plato, NDT debate treats rhetoric like a tool of philoso
phers, psychologists, and logians. CEDA, like Aristotle, treats rhetoric like a
tool of democracy and therefore believes it should fall within the realm of
common knowledge. The distinction is important. NDT demands that the
audience adjust to the speaker, whereas CEDA demands that the speaker
adjust to the audience.
In this essay, we have presented and reviewed recent theoretical and
empirical writings concerning the differences between NDT and CEDA de-
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bate. We have suggested that the two segments have modeled their re
spective activities in reasoning similar to that of the two most influential
rhetoricians in history. If the merits of either activity are to be debated, their
theoretical roots should be considered as a foundation. Theoretical frame
works can provide the NDT and CEDA debate community with a sound
philosophical basis for these activities.
As Thomas warns:
If forensics events are to become more than a club activity, then clear and
defensible educational purposes for them must be established and main
tained. Any cocurricular activity without perceived educational rationale is
forever at risk for the continuation of departmental or institutional support
(14).
As educators, it is our responsibility to identify and evolve theory. Little-
john observed that "The term communication theory usually refers to the
body of theories that makes up our understanding of the communication
process The field of communication is so young that it has not produced
much theory, so our knowledge of communication still relies on an eclectic
approach. This situation is changing, however, and we will see more direct
theorizing about communication" (3-5). We contend that intercollegiate
debate has evolved with little theoretical foundation Into two organizations
with different philosophies. These philosophies appear to resemble the clas
sical rhetorical theories of Plato and Aristotle, whether the likenesses are
intentional or not. By identifying underlying philosophies, forensics edu
cators can develop theoretical perspectives and intelligently justify their
approaches.
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